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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'. 
BEI{X.l\RD L. ROSE, ) dba Commercial Factors, 
Plaintiff, Case ( -vs.~ No. 9097 
r.~OUIS STRIKE, ) De f erw.lant. 
j 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover from the 
defendant the fac.e amount of an account receivable of 
one C. M. Roestcnburg & Sons, Inc., which account was 
assigned by said C. 1'1. Roestenburg & Sons, Inc., to the 
plaintiff~ 
After issue was joined, each of the parties hereto 
separately moved for summary judgment in his favor~ 
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~\ pre-trial proc~eding- \VUH held in the trial eourt and~ 
n ~ a TeAul t, t.he follov.ring pre-trial order~ as amended, 
'\~ras n1a de ( R. ·{~) ~ 
d rrhe abtf'C~l-(lDl itlCt] Ulfl1l (•f eame regularly befonj 
t.l1 e eo1.1 r·t. foe pretrial on i\larch ] 7 ~ 1 ~~;l9. Tl1 e pM rties werr 
1 )rcse11t in prrso11 Hl!U 'Yero a l~o represented hy eou11sel 
a~ follO"\VS: 
'~~,or the plaintiff, 1-Ierrill lC. Davis., Esq. 
'' Ji10f the defendant~ I..JCOnard Elton~ Esq. 
'' rJ1}1C f ol] 0 \\' ing rna tters aTe not iu dispute, and llO 
proof ·w· ill he l' e q u i red t.o ( ~ 8 t n 11 li f-1 h them a 1. the t ri ill of 
this la1\'suit: 
"1. Plaintiff and defendant each bought accounts 
re.eeivable from C. [\f.. Roestenburg and Sons~ Inc. 
u2~ ~4. ~heek from Convair, of v,~hich Exhlbit 1 is a 
phol o.~tatic copy, \Vas sent to C. \f. R-oestenburg and Son~~ 
1 ne., in payment of inYoieus 'vhi,·ll had been assigned to 
defendant and plu inti ff, plaintiff's interest therein 
being $2305.00~ 
"3. ..~.-\.n officer of (;+ 1\.f ~ l=toesten burg a1Hl Sons, Inc., 
aRked the defcndunt if he v.:•onlrl take the cheek and pny 
thu plaintiff or if Iloestenburg should give the check to 
p1aint.iff and have plaintiff pay the defendant,. and the 
defendant replied, 'Give me the r.heck. ~ 
.(~ 4. Itoestenburg gave the defendant the Convair 
cheek on or .about the 5th day of ... :\ugust~ 1958. 
'' 5. rrh(~ plaintiff notified the drfendan t hy phone on 
il_ugust ~, 1958, to paJ- the $2305~00 direct to plaintiff. 
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H fi. 'fhc· dPt'Pndant refu~ed plaintiff'~ request by 
phoup nud p.aid tlu_· $~;J0;).00 to ( ~- ~L J{.oestenburg and 
~onst Inc~ 
d T. The ~let'endant held t l~c Convair cheek until the 
11th day of August, 1958~ \Y·hen he deposited it in his 
hank aecount~ aud on said 11th day of August, 1958, de-
fendant gave C. \I. R-oestenburg and Sons hi~ eheck for 
$2305.00, r(!fJl'e-~euting the difference bet,veen the amount 
,\~hiel1 l•e had corning for aceounts receivable assigned by 
Roe~ h.l n burg to him and the amount of the check sent by 
Convair 1 o U~ hf. l{.oes ten burg and Son~, Inc~~ said Striko 
('lu)ck la .. ing marked Exhibit 2. 
~ ~s. On .t\ugust 11, 1958, C .. ~f .. Roestenhurg and 
Sonst Inc., in the presence of the defendant eashed the de-
fendant Js check for $2305.00~ after being identified by 
dcf cnda.n t .. 
"~ 9.. Mx hibi t 3 is a photostat ie copy of t }J e ITl votec 
under 'vhir.h plaintjff (•Injms the $2305.00. 
"10. On .. A.ugust 8,. 19581 (~. M. Roestenburg and 
Sons~ Ine..~ sent to the plaintiff a check marked Exhibit 4, 
at the request of plaintiff and aftor defendant llad refused 
to pay plaintiff the $2305 .. 00, and referred him to Roes-
tenburg-, and tlds cheek was deposited by the plaintiff in 
his bank account and 'vas dishonored by tl~e maker ,s 
bank for lack of funds on August 12, 1958, and notice of 
said d i ~honor '\\""as recci v ed by the plaintiff on August 13, 
1958, said notice of dishonor being marked Exhibit 5 and 
att a(·hPd to Exhibit 4. 
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~ ~ 11. Defendant kntnv that plaintiff \VHS purchasing 
arr,.ouuts receivable from U~ AL Itoestenhurg and Sons for 
about a month before the Convair cheek "\\"H8 recoived hy 
( ~. \ r + R.O(~~ !<·II burg and Sons, lnr.. 
HIt is order(_~d that unlesr.; counsel for the parties 
herr to uotify the (·ourt to t1Le <·old l"a ry \vi thin five -dnys 
from the mailing of a copy of thit=-1 order to ~aid <~ounsel, 
that the foregoing o,vill be eonsidercu Ly the court as t.l1c 
undiRputcd faets iu thiB e.aset and the court '"ill rule upon 
t1H_~ respertive motions l1eretofore made by earh party for 
judgment 
'~ ])atcd ut Salt Lake City~ l~tah, this 18th day of 
March, 1959." 
/s/ A. H+ ELIJ~:TT 
Ju.dge 
Based upon the foregoing pre-trial order, the trial 
court ma{le and entered its judgment in favor of plain· 
tifl" .and agD i nst defendant (It 16). It ~~ from thi8 judg-
ment that this appeal is taken lTy the defendant. 
PoiNT I~ 
T·HE TRI.AJJ (~()l~l~-T ~~ltit~JD IN Gll ... \NTIXG SU~[­
I\1AR.Y JUDG~lli~XfJ.., IN F~_A_ VOR OF PLA1Nrl1IFF. 
PoixT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX REFUSING TO 
GRANT 'rHB ~fOTION OF THE DEFENDAXrr FOR 
SU!\IltA_ItY .JUDG~fENT. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUI\fENT 
PolNT 1 ~ 
't'l! E rrl~.l .-\ r.J ( 1 ()l~T~T ERRED IX GR.\NTING SU~f­
\t A R't~ .J r 1 H ~~lENT T~ F1\ "\TOR OF PT~A TN'Tlr'fi\ 
Po1 ~T II. 
Tllll~ rrRll\_L ('~()l r1~r1~ l~RitED IN REFCSING TO 
nlL\:\T~ pl,lLI~~ .:\10rl,ION OF rl,fiE DEFEND .... ;\.l\T FOR 
~ l T .\l ~\1 i\lt Y J TTDG~IENT. 
},or tl1e sake or cln ri t.y in the argument~ the plaintiff, 
Bernard T.J. R.o8e~ doing business as CommerQial Factors, 
'vill be referred to herein as "Rose''; the defendant, 
Loni.~ Strike, \\·ill he referred to as ,; ,; Striken; and C. hl. 
Roegtenhurg and Sons)' In·e.)' will be referred to as "Roes-
b~nhurg~" 
The t'vo points involved herein 'vi1l be argued and 
r.onsidered together, slnee consideration of either iARue 
involYe~ a full consideration of the other i~sue .. 
rrhc trial court herein failerl to provide the parties 
and this Court with a memorandum of its decision, and 
the defendant Strike, now finds himself in the position of 
speculating and conjectuting as to the legal theory upon 
\\Thich the judgment is founded~ Defendant Strike, t1Iere-
fore~ is required to point to the several situations which 
might have existed in the mind of the trial court. 
It appears tl1at the o1dy possible situations are: (1) 
that no legal status or relationship existed between Rose 
and Strike, or between Rose and Roestenl1urg, except for 
the handling of n check in an ordinary and usual busi-
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ness manner; or, (2) that Strike \\·ns some sort. of .a 
fidueiary. 
Assuming, hut not auTni t.1 ing, the fiduciary relation-
Hhip bet,vecn Strike and Roestenburg, the pre-trial order 
~hov.n=' 11 o abuse or l~etr aya 1 of the confidence reposed~ 
1'~hr. (·or1trary appeaL~. Rtrikr returned to Roestenl}lll".!2; 
the sum of $"J~O.~l.OO, ropresenti ng the ~ ~x a e t di ff eronce 
hct.\\o·ecn the amount of the Strike account receivable and 
the c~onvail' (•l H ~(l k { R. 10) I T t is (~]ear t lla t n 0 1Jcncfit or 
enrichment resulted t.o Strike. Such circumstances eoulrl 
not po~~ibly l1ave etcatPd a trust for the benefit of R.ose. 
This court in Ren-shtMV v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co·m-
pany? 87 l~tuh 359~ 35 P. (2) 298, made it unmistakably 
'"' ,., ~ ~ The existence of the fiduciary relation-
ship alone is not sufficient to erPa tc a i ru~t. 
There mu~t Hlso be~~ het ra.\·al of the confidence 
rc·po8ef1 or ~omP hreaeh of duty imposed under 
it. , llo1ve v. Home & Ogden Bu II Be a ring Co. 
(C. C. A.) 154 F. 820, 810; 65 (~. J. 4i9. 
HaviT1g ost.a blisl1ed the fiduciary relation, the 
burden \\-as st.ill upon plaintiff to show SU(~h be-
1_ ruyal of 1lu11 relationship as V{ould give rise to 
th(l r.onstruetive trust. Scott,~+ Crouch, 24 l~tah, 
B77. 67 P. 1068; Taylor Y. Hunnell, ~11 CaL 601, 
:!96 P. 288; 65 (\ J. 491~ n 
rl1his \vas repeated in the same case later reported in 
87 utah 364, 40 P. (2) 403: 
'~: • 4 • ''rhile the fiduciary relationship is a pre-
requisite to the ereation of a constructi"'fe trust~ 
sueh as "~e arc lu~re cou side ring, yet the trust 
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d()t·~ !tot ari~c~ nlltil that rclation~hi p hns 
hPrn I H.\t rayed or viola t <·d. 1 t i ~ tlu.~ coIl rid <.)n t i a l 
l'~·ln t LOnship plus t.hP n hu~e Of the ("O!l ndc•[l('(:. 
1h ns imposed, t.hnt n nti1o rizes equity to con-
~1 ru(·t. a trust for t.he benefit of tl~e part_y whosP 
('011 fldcner. ha~ JH•Pn n JHISed~ n * jt: * 
Hnse ('omplains of Rtrike because ~trikr did vrhat 
t l1(• or·dinn ry and rea~onable huRineg~man ·w·ould ha,~P 
done~ l'(·1uru t1u~ difference of $2305r00 to the party from 
'"hom [ ~ ,,. a~ r·p~~l! i ve~ l. 
1,lle legal and equitable problems involved herein 
earl he clearly understood by consideration of the alter-
na ti \-e situations set out in paragraph (h), Section 330 of 
1 bP Hr.~lntemrnt of tl•e l.H\'·:~ rrrusts (2d)t ,\~hich states: 
''h. TRUST FOR ~\ PARTICULAR CRED I-
TOR OF THE SETTLOR. If a debtor delivers 
money or other property to a third person, not an 
agent of the creditor, 1\,.ith inRtruction~ to use the 
money or other property to pay the ereditor, the 
third person may be a tru~tee for the debtor~ or 
on the other hand he may be a trustee for the 
rredi tor. "\Vhether the third person is trustee for 
the debtor or is trustee for the c-reditor depeih]s 
upon the manifestation of intention of tho debt.or4 
If the ttan~fer of the property to the third 
person \vas made ll.Y the debtor in pursuance of an 
agreement 'vitl• thr creditor~ the terms of the 
agreement are controlling on the question whether 
the third person if.; trustee for the e.reditor. "\Vhere 
the creditor agrees that if tt1e property is tranH-
ferred to the third person he ,\·i 11 release his claim 
against the debtor, it is (~lrnr t.hat. the third person 
becomes trustee for the creditor. Even though the 
creditor docs not agree to release his claim, and 
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even though he does not agrc~e to forbear from eu-
for<~illg his claim, ordinarily where the 1 runsfer i~ 
made in fiiH'suall(·e of un agrePment with the crrLdi-
tor, tlle third person becomes l r11 ~teP for the 
ereditor. 
If the transfer of the property to t1le third 
pergon w n ~ not n1a ("1 e in p u rsuanee of any H gr-ee-
nu~nt •N·ith the creditor, the inference is that the 
truRt iH for the debtor and not for the cre(Jit or, 
nnd the debtor (·H n revoke the trlH3t. at any time 
"\vithout the consent of the creditor~ In such a eaHe 
l lu~ t.rausfer i~ ordinarily made hy the debtor 
simply for his o\vn (~onvenienec, without any in-
t.cnl ion to confer upon the crerlltor irrevocable 
rights. Even in SU(.~}l a ea ~o~ hov..Tcver ~ the debtor 
n1ay man.ifest an intention to create a trust in favor 
of the creditor and to gi \··e l1im an in t e I'e~ t in the 
property of which the debtor cannot subsequently 
deprive_~ hint hy revoki11g the disposition. 
If a debtor deli vcrs money or other property 
tu a thi ['d person vlith instruetions to use the 
money or other properly to puy tl1e creditor, 1 J1e 
thire.l person may be merely an agent of the debtor .. 
\Vhether he is an agent or a tru~t e(.• depend~ upon 
\,~bet l1 cr t.i tle to the property passes to the thin l 
perAon or vthether the third person merely has 
poH~PH~ion of the subject matter. See ·~ B~ ·Jf the 
third person is merely an agent of the debtor, the 
dehtor ~l~n1 at any time terminate the agen-cy and 
compel the third pcrt:1on to deli vcr the property 
h~H·k to llim.' 1 * * * 
~-\ s to the manifestation of the intent of Roestenburg~ 
the pertinent a.nd pointed facts reveal that \vhilc Strike 
hel~ the check, und prior to its deposit, Roestenburg had 
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deli \TP r'Pd its cheek to l~o~c I' or the iSU id surn of $~305.00 
{ l{. 10) ; tha 1. at t hl\ same time that ktrike depo~ited the 
( "iouYnir check:t Ntrike gave Roe~tenuurg his check for 
~~;~o:-;_out and Roestenhurg- tiH~n immediat(~ly cashed the 
St r[k,. (~het·k and rt·e(_~iYed the money (R. 10) ; that the 
Roestenburg check to Ito~e \\'aS not dishonored uutil after 
the ~ t rikl~ check had he en cashed and Roes ten burg had 
rP<·t~i ved t hr funds ( R. 10) ; t.ha t there is no ~J 1 ov.~ing of 
any agreement bet~veen R-oestenburg and R-ose~ and that 
there is no shov.r[ng of any agr·eement betv.reen Strike and 
Rose. In fact~ there were no agreements at all bet\voon 
these par1[t"~s. rl.,he manifest i11tention of R.oestenburg 
clearl~; "\vas to rl~tain control of the $2305.00 and it did just 
that. 1'ht) trial cn11rt. did not find, nor could it :t thnt Strike 
kne'v or shou1d have kuov-.'ll of any breach of trust or 
anticipated breach of trust b)r Roestenh11rg. The la\v 
does not presume 'vrougful or dishonest acts~ nor does 
the la'v require buf.;inessmen to presume and anticipate 
vlrong and dishone~ty~ Reagley v. l/"-u-iled States Gypsunt 
(\i., 116 Utah 337, 209 P. 2d 750. A.ctnally, Strike had 
e'rery rea~o11 to believe that the Roestenburg cheek to 
Rose v.r'"as good, since he gave Roestenhurg a. clle~.k in an 
amount suffieient to cover the Roestenburg check to Rose. 
Scott on Tru._'lfs, \ 1olume 2~ page 1608, contains tl1is 
comment: 
"~ ~ * '"' Even though the transf'Pree did not rec.civc 
the property with aetual knowledge of the breach 
of tru~t., yet if after receiYing actual kno"'"ledge 
"·hile he still retains the property he refuses to 
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re~ ~ (H~t· it 1 o the trusC it \vould ~eem that the helH.~­
ficiar~y can ellarge him ·w·it l1 tl~e vahu~ of the prop-
erty at the time of surh refusal \Yith inh~r<.~st 
thereo11~ or ,vjth its value at tlH.~ t i Inc of the decree 
\\·jtl1 tl•e income '\\"'hirh he has received therefrom. 
\\'here, h O\\~eve r, t.lH~ t ra nsf t~ ree has not di~­
Jl08cd of the property., and did not receive it \vith 
.aetual kno\vlerlge or the hreae.h of tru8t!t and did 
not refuse to 1·est ore it after receiving such kno\vl-
('clg-c~ it ''Tould seem that if he is ready and 'villing 
to restore the property to the trust with any in-
eorne \vhieh he has received from the property 
vrhile he held it, he shou.td hf under ·n-o further lia-
/; 11 ity." ~ * ttc ( ~Jmpluu:;i~ ~up plied} 
Strike Vt'as r1ot only 'villing to restore the $2305r00 
to Itoestenburg, but he actually did deliver this sum t.o 
R·oestenburg. 
Rose made his demand upon Strike and, at the same 
time he demanded, and received~ a check from Roestcn-
1Jurg ( lt 10). Suppose the Roestenburg check to Rose 
had been honored~ :B-,urther, and in addition, suppose t.hat 
~trike had delivered $2305.00 to 1-tose. Ccrt.ainly, no sane 
purson \vould contend that Rose should have both. Also, 
\vhat \\~ould Strike's position have been with Roestenburg 
if he had dcliY(~red the $2305.00 to Rose·~ 'Vouldn 't he 
l•av(~ run the risk of making- himself liable to R.oeRten-
hurgf l{ose, by his rcry act of demanding and receiving 
the R.oe~tcnburg check made his intention manifest, and 
it. 'vas simply this - Rose 1va.s playing botl• t~nds against 
the middle+ This d.oes not give rise to equity. 
10 
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1 n its flnal aiH11y~i~, thi~ ease boils do\vn to a situation 
·wherP Ito~P purr.ha~t·(l an account receivable from l{.oes-
t.rnlJurg andr for rPnsoBH kuo\vU only to lli.m~P1f, failed to 
t~·i \~i • no tiel, of the a ~sigument to ConvHir ~ the dehlo1·. 
( rr11 i ~ [n1'rl'tlll('(~ 3JlP~ln r':--l reasonable f'or the reason that 
l ht· Convair eheck \\'a~ made payable only to Jloc:-31 ,_~u­
burg) ( 1~~ x hi hit P -1 ) . 1-l.ose a ~s umed t.h i.s risk~ and the 
d(·l ~l nr, ( 1 run~nir,. paid the account to the ouJy dehto~· 
kno\Yn to it, Rocstenburg .. Rocstt~ul~urg., whir..h then held 
tl1P funds, $2:-~05.00, as a constructive trustee for it~ 
as~ ig r tee~ Rose~ violated and fail eu in i 1 ~ < ~ 1 d .v to RoF;e. 
Thu Court Js attrntion iH called to the fact that the 
prr.-1 rial order makeR no I"eference to the Second Crt use 
o I' .t\ {·tion in t}l e plaintiff's r..om plaint. The reason for 
this is that the plaintiff made no effort to justify himself 
n H a '~ p t'Otl~e (.(~d assignee" under the provisions of Tit.le 
9~ Chapter 3, Ctah Code A.nnotated, 1953t a~ amended. 
~\~ a ma1 ter of fact, counsel for plaintiff, in effect, aban-
doned this cause of ael io11. Tlle asf·dgnment to Rose 'vas 
not a '''vritten assignment for \·alue, sif!HCd by the 
assignor," as required hy Section 4 of the ... \ceounts Rc~ 
ceivable Act (Exhibit P-3 )4 
CO~CLUSION 
Rose ant l the trial court would no,\· impose tll c bur-
den upon Strike of assuming a responsibility, not because 
of any dereliction of duty, dishoneRty or unfaithful act of 
Strike, but because Rose voluntarily· exposed himself to 
11 
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a risk 'vhich resulted in a loss to him because l1is assignor, 
not Strike, failed to perform hi~ dut.y. lt i~ inconceivable 
that the decision arrived at by the trial court could be 
justified in either la\v or equity. 
ltppellant huhmits that tl~c trial court erred in the 
various rulings and acts ~et forth under the points herein 
presented and argued~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICII, ELTON & MANGUM, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
307 Utah Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
12 
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